What can explain the Chinese patent explosion? by Eberhardt, Markus et al.
What Can Explain the Chinese Patent Explosion?
By Markus Eberhardt,a Christian Helmers,b and Zhihong Yuc
a School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD and
Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford; e-mail: Markus.Eberhardt@nottingham.ac.uk
b Santa Clara University, and Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford
c School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Abstract: We analyse the ‘explosion’ of patent filings by Chinese residents both domesti-
cally and in the United States during the early 2000s, employing a unique dataset of 374,000
firms matching patent applications to manufacturing census data. Our analysis reveals that
patenting is highly concentrated among a small number of firms, operating in the information
and communication technology sector. Although increases in patent filings by these compa-
nies are partly driven by increased R&D intensity, our analysis suggests that the explosion of
patent filings at the Chinese patent office is driven by factors other than underlying innovative
behavior, including government subsidies that encourage patent filings directly.
JEL classification: L25, O12
1
CHINESE PATENT EXPLOSION 2
1 Introduction
China’s economic success over the past decades has been widely regarded as the result of its abil-
ity to produce manufactured goods at low cost, building on the availability of cheap labour and scale
economies, while relying on existing technologies of production. China’s ability to upgrade its tech-
nology base and move up the value-chain is frequently argued to be hampered by weak (intellectual)
property rights enforcement (Zhao, 2006). More recently, however, the notion that China is catching up
fast in terms of scientific and technological innovation has gained considerable ground. The number of
domestic invention patent filings with the Chinese patent office (SIPO) has increased at an average rate
of 32% per annum from around 15,600 to over 700,000 during the period 1999-2013.1 Utility patent
filings by Chinese residents2 with the U.S. patent office (USPTO) grew at an annual rate of 35% to
nearly 15,500 over the same period, albeit from a low base of 271 in 1999.3 This patent ‘explosion’ at
home and abroad is paired with strengthened statutory intellectual property (IP) rights protection (Park,
2008) and an increased interest by policymakers in the role of IP in fueling domestic innovation, with a
particular focus on foreign technology transfer and incentives to invest in R&D. Accordingly, the recent
National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) envisions an increase in the number of annual patent
applications (including invention, utility patents and designs) from 1.2 million in 2010 to 2 million in
2015. The plan also foresees a doubling of the number of patent applications filed by Chinese appli-
cants abroad over the same time horizon. These ambitious targets reflect a positive outlook in parts of
the literature on Chinese innovation, the Chinese IP rights system, and Chinese development in general
(Fischer and von Zedtwitz, 2004; Subramanian, 2011).
At the same time, there is some evidence to suggest that most of the innovation in China is of merely
incremental nature and hence the corresponding patents protect ‘small inventive steps’ (Puga and Tre-
fler, 2010). While such incremental innovation may still be valuable and in fact account in large part
for China’s success (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011), the concern is that the recent increase in patent
applications is produced overwhelmingly by inventions embodying little technological progress. Re-
cent empirical evidence suggests that patent subsidies, introduced by local governments in virtually all
Chinese provinces from 1999 onwards, have also played an important role in explaining the ‘explosive’
growth of Chinese patenting (Li, 2012; Dang and Motohashi, 2015). Boeing and Mueller (2015) sug-
1Data from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
2Throughout the paper we use ‘Chinese firms’ and ‘Chinese residents’ interchangeably. Our firm-level dataset covers
indigenous firms as well as subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. U.S. utility patents correspond to invention patents in China.
3Data taken from various USPTO Performance and Accountability Reports.
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gest that patent quality of PCT filings4 by Chinese applicants is low by international comparison and
that quality has been decreasing over time as the number of filings has increased. They also find some
evidence for a negative correlation between patent quality and filing subsidies.
The view that China’s patent explosion over the past two decades was driven largely by an increase in the
patenting of low quality inventions — fueled by public incentive schemes — stands in stark contrast to
earlier findings in the literature, which explained the recent increase in Chinese firms’ patenting activity
by an influx of FDI, the opening of the economy in particular through China’s WTO accession, and
a major overhaul of the legal framework in form of amendments of the patent law (Hu and Jefferson,
2009). Despite widespread doubts about the link between innovative prowess and the Chinese patent
explosion in the media and in policy circles,5 there is no quantitative analysis based on representative
firm-level data that investigates the determinants of the Chinese patent explosion during its critical years
in the early 2000s.
We analyze the recent ‘explosion’ in the number of patent applications by manufacturing firms registered
in China with SIPO as well as the USPTO, which is by far the most important destination for Chinese
patent filings abroad (Wunsch-Vincent et al., 2015). In contrast to the study by Hu and Jefferson (2009)
our analysis is focused on ‘invention’ patents which are subject to substantive examination for novelty
and inventiveness in both constituencies; this prevents our analysis from being distorted by the vast
number of utility models and design patents with low innovative content that do not require substantive
examination by the Chinese or U.S. patent offices. Apart from separately analysing the determinants of
patenting with SIPO and the USPTO, we infer information on underlying inventions by assessing where
companies seek patent protection: only domestically with SIPO or (also) with the USPTO. Not only
are the direct and indirect costs associated higher in the U.S., but inventions are required to overcome a
higher novelty hurdle in patent examination during our sample period. These differences suggest that a
comparison of patents filed with the USPTO and SIPO reveals additional information on the underlying
invention and the corresponding patentees.
We construct a representative firm-level dataset that combines invention patent data and company finan-
cials. We match SIPO and USPTO patents filed between 1985 and 2006 to around 316,000 manufactur-
ing firms contained in China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) compiled by the National
4Filings under the ‘Patent Cooperation Treaty’ allow an inventor to simultaneously seek protection in a large number of
countries using a single application.
5In particular The Economist magazine has voiced repeated concerns that ‘merely churning out patents does little to advance
innovation’ (Dec 13th 2014; see also Oct 14th 2010).
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Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) for the period 1999-2006.6 The period covered represents perhaps
the most interesting period in state innovation and IP policy as well as firm innovation activity in China:
it encompasses aggressive opening up to FDI, policy commitments related to WTO-entry in 2001, a
substantial increase in exporting, an amendment to the patent law, increased government incentives to
patent and an accelerated pace of privatisation (Fischer and von Zedtwitz, 2004; Naughton, 2007; Hu
and Mathews, 2008; Li, 2012; Dang and Motohashi, 2015).
Our descriptive analysis shows that a small number of Chinese companies concentrated in the informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) equipment industry accounts for a large share of the dramatic
increase in USPTO patents held by Chinese residents, with underlying technologies mostly related to
electronics and semiconductors. This select group of firms also accounts for a substantial share of SIPO
patents though there is a larger number of companies across a wider range of industries obtaining domes-
tic patent protection. The concentration of patenting in an industry that has moved from ‘Patent Portfolio
Races’ during the 1990s (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) to outright ‘Patent Wars’ (Financial Times, 17th Oc-
tober 2011) casts some doubt on the underlying technological value of the steep increase in patent counts
produced by Chinese firms in this sector. Previous empirical work on Chinese patenting missed this con-
centration since analysis was based on aggregate data (Sun, 2000; Hu and Mathews, 2008; Hu, 2010) or
self-reported patenting without distinction between low-sophistication design or utility and more sub-
stantive invention patents (Hu and Jefferson, 2009). Comparing the descriptive statistics for patenting
with non-patenting firms, and for those firms patenting in the U.S. with those exclusively patenting in
China, reveals a large number of significant differences to motivate our empirical analysis.
We rely on the patent production function approach (Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001)
to explain the patenting decision and number of patent filings by Chinese companies with SIPO and the
USPTO, respectively. Apart from the standard predictors of patenting, such as R&D expenditure, firm
size, and age, we are particularly interested in the importance of a firm’s exporting behavior, financial
constraints, as well as province-level patent subsidies in predicting patenting behaviour. There is a large
literature showing a positive effect of innovation on exporting (Salomon and Shaver, 2005; Lachenmaier
and Woessmann, 2006; Girma et al., 2008; Harris and Li, 2009; Ganotakis and Love, 2011; Melitz and
Trefler, 2012), which suggests that exporting in turn should predict patenting provided the patents reflect
underlying innovations. Similarly, financial variables are key determinants of corporate innovation ac-
tivities (Brown et al., 2009, 2012; Guariglia and Liu, 2014) and may help identify structural differences
6Our regressions also include firms which are not part of our Qin/Oriana bridge dataset (see Section 2): we empirically
account for selection from the larger ASIE (374,000 firms) into the integrated ASIE-Qin/Oriana (316,000 firms) dataset.
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between types of firms based on where they chose to safeguard their IP rights. Finally, with specific ref-
erence to China there is recent evidence which suggests that state subsidies are an important element in
explaining patent filings of Chinese firms (Li, 2012; Dang and Motohashi, 2015; Lei et al., 2015) and we
add information on provincial patent filing subsidy schemes to our patent production functions.
Our findings confirm that patent filings with SIPO are in part driven by state incentive schemes, and
we further document a negative correlation between export intensity and domestic patenting. In con-
trast, for USPTO patentees resident in China the incentive variable is insignificant and export intensity
is positively correlated with foreign patenting. Those companies in China filing with the USPTO are
substantially larger in terms of number of workers than those only filing domestically. Financial con-
straints play an important role in innovation behaviour but do not appear to be a source of differential
firm behaviour eliciting qualitative differences. Our findings thus suggest that domestic patenting in
China, on average, is driven by state incentives and distinct ‘types’ of firms (in terms of size and export
intensity) compared with those firms patenting overseas with the USPTO.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on innovation and economic development (Nordhaus, 1969;
Penrose, 1973) by exploring the drivers behind a dramatic shift in the number of patent filings in China.
Our results illustrate that large increases in domestic patenting activity per se cannot be seen as indicative
of associated changes in innovative behavior in a developing country context. The strong concentration
of patenting in ICT that we find in China on the one hand, and the impact of public incentive programs
as well as the inverse export-patenting relationship on the other, further caution that a broader techno-
logical take-off is not (yet) occurring. That said, other successful Asian economies have seen similar
concentrations in patenting activity, in particular during the early take-off phases.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the construction of our dataset.
Section 3 explains our empirical strategy. Sections 4 and 5 discuss some descriptive evidence and our
analytical results. Section 6 offers some brief concluding thoughts.
7Mahmood and Singh (2003) point to a strong concentration of USPTO patents (1970-1999) among assignees in South
Korea and Singapore as the top 50 assignees hold 85% and 70% of each country’s USPTO patents, respectively.
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2 Data
2.1 Firm-level Data
Our firm-level data come from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) compiled by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). ASIE includes the whole population of state-owned firms
as well as all non-state-owned companies with annual sales above CNY5 million (around US$600,000).
On average, over 200,000 firms from all regions of China are included each year, accounting for 95% of
total Chinese industrial output and 98% of industrial exports, covering 39 two-digit industries, of which
30 belong to manufacturing industries. Our data cover four distinct years in the period 2001-6, with a
sample of over 800,000 observations from 374,000 firms. Key variables include a unique firm identifier,
R&D expenditure (representing the binding constraint for analysis: in the version of ASIE available
to us this variable is only reported in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006), exports, ownership, output, sales,
employment, and industry of operation.8
2.2 Patent Data
The patent data come from the European Patent Office’s PATSTAT database (version 10/2010). We
extract patents filed by Chinese residents (this includes indigenous and foreign(-invested) firms). Our
analysis focuses on the application date of a patent. We obtain information on the grant status of patent
filings from a 2014 version of PATSTAT to account for a grant lag of several years.
2.3 Matching/Bridge
Due to the absence of a unique identifier shared by the firm-level and patent data, the main data problem
consists in matching patents to firms. This is generally challenging for a number of reasons (Helmers
et al., 2011); in the case of China, matching is even more difficult due to the different ways in which
firm names can be recorded: using (a) Chinese characters, (b) pinyin transcription, (c) a translation of
the Chinese names into English, and (d) any mix of (a)-(c).
The Chinese census data contain only firm names using Chinese characters (a), whereas PATSTAT con-
tains (b), (c) and (d). In principle, to match patents to firms we would have to either transcribe firms’
8In line with the existing literature (e.g. Guariglia and Liu, 2014), we exclude observations with negative values of output,
sales, exports, capital or intermediate inputs; and further observations with total assets less than total fixed assets or total liquid
assets or with total sales less than exports.
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names contained in ASIE or the assignee names in PATSTAT. Instead we identified an alternative so-
lution: the Qin and Oriana databases provided by Bureau Van Dijk offer firm-level balance sheet data
for individual firms in the Asia-Pacific region. The combination of Qin/Oriana contain data for about
451,000 Chinese firms for 2001-2009. The advantage of using Qin/Oriana is that these report firm names
using the Latin alphabet as well as the ASIE unique firm identifier. This allows us to link Qin/Oriana
to ASIE through the unique identifier and to use Qin/Oriana firm names to match with assignee names
contained in PATSTAT. While this approach allows us to match patent data to Chinese firms, it also has
some limitations, which together with suggested remedies are discussed in an online appendix.
Our integrated dataset matching ASIE to Qin/Oriana covers 316,000 firms, while the full ASIE sample
for 2001-6 contains 374,000 firms (average Ti = 2.3). Tables A-1 and A-2 in the online appendix contain
information and descriptive statistics on the sample of firms used in our regression analysis.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our objective is to analyze the drivers behind the explosion in patent filings in China. The existing
evidence is ambivalent about the factors that have contributed to the rapid rise in patent filings. On the
one hand, Hu and Jefferson (2009) suggest that patenting in China is explained by increases in FDI,
China’s WTO accession, and improvements in the legal framework and enforceability of IP, with the
latter two empirically captured by time dummies. On the other, there is a widely-held view that SIPO
rubber-stamps patent filings which protect at best low-value, incremental inventions (Puga and Trefler,
2010), and that filings are largely driven by government incentives which target patenting directly (Li,
2012; Dang and Motohashi, 2015; Lei et al., 2015).
To explore the determinants of patenting in China we use the patent production function approach (Pakes
and Griliches, 1980; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) that relates a firm’s patent filings to a standard set of
variables, such as R&D expenditure, firm size and age. In light of the export-innovation literature,
we extend the standard patent production equation to include a firm’s export intensity: there is strong
theoretical and empirical evidence pointing to a positive association between innovation and exporting,
and if patent filings are driven by innovation we would expect exporting to predict patenting (Salomon
and Shaver, 2005; Girma et al., 2008; Melitz and Trefler, 2012). Our extended specification also includes
financial variables that are key determinants of corporate innovation activities (Brown et al., 2009, 2012;
Guariglia and Liu, 2014). To test directly for the role of subsidies in the patent explosion, we include a
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province-level indicator for the availability of government patent subsidies in the model.
Our main interest is in our ability to predict patent filings with SIPO by companies resident in China
using the patent production function approach, which allows us to analyze the determinants of the Chi-
nese patent explosion. To provide a benchmark against which to compare our results on the predictors
of patent filings with SIPO, we use the same production function to predict patent filings by Chinese
residents with the USPTO: since patent filings in the U.S. are subject to a different standard than filings
with SIPO (for a detailed discussion see online appendix D), comparing the determinants of USPTO and
SIPO patent filings by the same set of companies in China offers additional insights on the determinants
of the patent explosion in China. More specifically, controlling for all standard determinants of firm-
level innovation and patenting including a set of variables capturing financial constraints, if patenting
with SIPO is driven by factors other than innovation, we expect in particular export intensity to predict
filings only at the USPTO but not SIPO. In contrast, due to the policy drive to promote domestic patent-
ing directly, we expect patent subsidies to predict filings only with SIPO but not the USPTO.
We test these hypotheses through a number of alternative empirical models which are all variations
of the Pakes and Griliches (1980) patent production approach. We begin with the patenting decision,
where we disregard the patent count and focus merely on the prevalence of patenting. We employ binary
choice models to analyse two dichotomous outcomes, namely patenting with SIPO and patenting with
the USPTO, in a standard random utility formulation (Greene and Hensher, 2010).
We address selection into our integrated dataset, a subsample of ASIE, as part of our analysis of the
patenting decision by modelling selection and patenting jointly: in bivariate probit models for USPTO
and SIPO patenting, respectively (results available on request), and then in trivariate probit models
jointly estimating selection, patenting with the USPTO, and patenting with SIPO.9 The formal represen-
tation of the trivariate probit model is

1{sipo}ipt
1{uspto}ipt
1{ss}ipt
 = Φ

α1 + INNOV′iptβ1 + EX′iptγ1 + FIN′iptδ1 + INCENT′iptη1 +X ′iptθ1 + d1p + d1t
α2 + INNOV′iptβ2 + EX′iptγ2 + FIN′iptδ2 + INCENT′iptη2 +X ′iptθ2 + d2p + d2t
α3 + INNOV′iptβ3 + EX′iptγ3 + FIN′iptδ3 + INCENT′iptη3 +X ′iptθ3 + d3p + d3t
, Σ
 ,
where Φ(·,Σ) is a multivariate normal distribution, 1{·} represents binary variables (‘sipo’ and ‘uspto’
for at least one patent application with SIPO and USPTO, respectively; ‘ss’ is the sample selection
9Addressing selection in these nonlinear models does not require an exclusion restriction from the selection equation:
identification is in principle given through functional form (Greene and Hensher, 2010).
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equation), and djp and d
j
t are province (see below) and time fixed effects. We enter five groups of
covariates to analyse the association of patenting with firm-level innovation effort (INNOV), export
behaviour (EX) and financial constraints (FIN), as well as government patenting incentives (INCENT),
on top of additional control variables (X) related to firm size, age, and ownership type.10 In an additional
specification we account for unobserved heterogeneity potentially distorting our results by including
provincial dummies in the trivariate probit models. The results from this exercise (available on request)
are qualitatively in line with those presented here.11
In order to gauge the reliability of our results in the face of potential endogeneity of our regressors, we
estimate instrumental variable (IV) probit models adopting first or first and second lags of all variables
(except firm age, ownership, and time dummies) as instruments.12
A second set of regressions then analyses the number of patent applications and grants by estimating
nonlinear functions which relate the patent count to firm characteristics, using the same sets of covariates
as above. We treat our panel as repeated cross-sections (see Bound et al., 1984), in the spirit of previous
work on China by Hu and Jefferson (2009), but like these authors consider fixed effects Poisson models
for robustness (see below). In empirical practice the choice between different approaches is primarily
driven by the ‘overdispersion’ problem of the Poisson estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Hilbe,
2011). The Negative Binomial estimator enables us to introduce a separate dispersion parameter κ to
overcome this issue:13 the formal model representation of these estimators is
Pr(Yit = yit) = [exp(−λit)λnit] /(yit!)
Pr(Yit = yit) =
Γ(yit + λ
1−c
it /κ)
yit!Γ(λ
1−c
it /κ)
(1 + κλcit)
−λ1−cit /κ (1 + λ−cit /κ)
yit
with yit the patent count and λit = exp(Z ′itϕ), where for convenience of notation we have expressed
the five sets of covariates and dummies detailed above with matrix Z and their respective coefficient
vectors with ϕ.
We also present results from a fixed effects (FE) Poisson model, where the inclusion of firm fixed effects
10Full details of all variables and controls included in the models are contained in the online appendix.
11It is well-known that the inclusion of a large number of fixed effects in nonlinear models creates serious bias due to
the incidental parameter problem. This problem should not create any difficulties for a mere 30 province dummies, however
China’s vast economic heterogeneity creates a separate problem here in that nine (two) provinces have no firms with any patent
applications with USPTO (SIPO) over the 4-year sample period, which means that firms from these provinces are dropped.
12Additional analysis (results available on request) replaces the dependent variable of at least one patent application with
that of at least one granted patent, which can act as a basic proxy for the quality of innovations — results are qualitatively
identical.
13Tests for the statistical significance of κ reject the Poisson estimator in favour of the NegBin alternative in all cases.
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limits the sample to ‘innovating firms.’ This reduces the number of observations from 804,766 to 507
(170 firms) in the USPTO and 7,113 (2,327 firms) in the SIPO analysis, but allows us to account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity thus giving an interpretation closer to causality than in our pooled
regressions.
In our analysis innovation effort is proxied by R&D expenditure. We employ contemporaneous R&D
expenditure (Pakes and Griliches, 1980) deflated by employment14 to avoid confounding the R&D effect
with that of firm size (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Log R&D expenditure per worker is entered as linear
and squared terms to allow firms in different tails of the distribution to impact patenting decisions and
patent counts differentially.
Inspired by the export-innovation literature we include the export intensity of a firm (export deflated by
sales) as an additional determinant of patenting. Our regressions separately control for firms with zero
exports and for ‘pure exporters’ (Defever and Riano, 2013) with export intensity in excess of 90% —
this cut-off is based on investigating a kernel density estimate for this variable.
Recent work by Brown et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2012) on advanced economies and Guariglia
and Liu (2014) on China highlighted the importance of financial constraints as key determinants of
corporate innovation strategies. We therefore include measures for firm liquidity, leverage and cash flow
as additional covariates.15
The municipal government of Shanghai started handing out patent filing subsidies in 1999 and by 2007,
80% of Chinese provinces had adopted such subsidy schemes (Dang and Motohashi, 2015). There are
substantial differences in subsidy programmes across provinces (Li, 2012) and many cities also offer
their own patent subsidies (Lei et al., 2015); some programmes offer filing or examination subsidies,
others pay out a cash reward only after successful grant. Some provincial and city governments fully
reimburse filing and examination fees, others only reimburse a fraction of the fees. Others even deter-
mine subsidy amounts on a case-by-case basis. We use data collected by Dang and Motohashi (2015)
on the presence and strength of provincial-level incentives targeting patenting directly, where our focus
is on filing subsidies. This dataset substantially extends the information on subsidy schemes used in an
earlier study by Li (2012) as it differentiates subsidy schemes between those that provide full or partial
reimbursement of fees. It represents the most comprehensive available dataset on patent subsidies in
14We add dummies for firms with zero R&D expenditure (87% of observations).
15We define liquidity as the difference between a firm’s current liquid assets and liabilities, normalised by total assets; and
leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Because R&D is treated as a current expense for accounting purposes
we add R&D expenses to the standard measure of net cash flow (after-tax earnings plus depreciation) to obtain gross cash flow
(see Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994); this cash flow variable is then normalised by total assets.
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China. Other studies on the effect of patent subsidies have used more limited data, Lei et al. (2015) for
example use data for six cities in the Jiangsu Province and Boeing and Mueller (2015) only rely on a
year dummy variable to capture the introduction of a subsidy programme. Further details about the data
used in our analysis and the evolution of patent subsidies across provinces over time are provided in the
online appendix.
Our choice of additional firm-level controls is guided by standard suggestions in the literature, namely
measures for size and age (both in logs), as well as characteristics with particular relevance for China,
namely ownership type and province dummies (the latter as a robustness exercise, results available on
request). Firm size is measured by employment and meant to capture possible economies of scale
in patent production. In an OECD country context firm age is intended to capture the experience of
older firms in the management of the patent application process (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), however
in a China emerging from a planned economy, this is an additional indicator for socialist period legacy.
Ownership (our designation is based on paid-in capital share in excess of 50%, following Guariglia et al.,
2011) includes two types of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) distinguishing those from Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan (HMT) and elsewhere (other). We further distinguish Private, State-Owned (SOEs),
Collective and Other Chinese firm types. We prefer to investigate the ‘direct’ effect of foreign direct
investment (FDI) on patenting behaviour rather than relying on proxies suggested in the literature to
capture ‘knowledge spillovers’ from FDI (Hu and Jefferson, 2009). We add year dummies to all models
which allows us to chart the changes in patenting over time. All standard errors reported are clustered at
the firm-level.
4 Descriptive Evidence
Our integrated dataset enables us to produce a number of powerful insights into Chinese patenting
through simple descriptive statistics. Tables 1 and 2 list the top-10 companies patenting with the USPTO
and SIPO, respectively. These tables are constructed using the patent data for the entire time horizon
1985 to 2006 for the firms in our integrated dataset.
Table 1 illustrates the concentration of USPTO patents among a small number of companies: the top-10
assignees account for slightly less than 75% of USPTO patents. Interestingly, three companies, Hong-
fujin (1), Fuzhun (3) and Futaihong (6), are subsidiaries of the Taiwanese-owned multinational Foxconn
Technology Group, the world’s largest contract manufacturer of 3C (Computer, Communication, Con-
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sumer electronics) products. These three subsidiaries account for 35% of total USPTO patent filings in
our matched dataset, adding in communications giant Huawei brings the tally to over 50%. As shown
in the last column of Table 1, with the exception of Sinopec, Nuctech, and BYD, all top-10 USPTO
patentees are in 3C industries. Table 2 shows SIPO patent filings, with the top-10 companies accounting
for over half of all patents. Here the dominant player is Huawei, filing nearly a quarter of SIPO patents,
whereas only one Foxconn subsidiary, Hongfujin, is among the top-10. Again, with the exception of
Sinopec, BYD and Baoshan, all companies listed in Table 2 are in 3C industries. Note that there is a
significant overlap of companies in Tables 1 and 2: six companies appear in both lists, with four of these
in 3C industries.
Apart from asking who patents, the question of what is patented is equally important. We classify
USPTO and SIPO patents according to the type of innovation they protect: product or process innovation
or a combination of the two. There is a common perception in the literature that patents protecting
product inventions reflect genuine innovations whereas process patents are of less innovative content as
they only indicate new ways of producing some output by existing means. We read random subsamples
of 1,900 USPTO and 980 SIPO patents.16 Table A-3 in the online appendix shows a breakdown of
patents filed by Chinese residents according to the innovation type they protect. For USPTO patents
nearly half cover product innovations and only 20% process innovations. The pattern looks different in
the case of SIPO patents: merely 30% protect product innovations and 37% process innovations. This
analysis suggests that inventions that are patented in China but not in the U.S. are more likely to protect
process innovations. In contrast, results for USPTO patents indicate that the share of patents protecting
product innovations is substantially higher.
Although there is clear evidence for substantial concentration of patenting among a small number of
firms with either jurisdiction, we can also distinguish the observable characteristics between firms which
(a) do and do not patent, and in turn between those which (b) patent with SIPO and the USPTO. Table 3
provides the respective unconditional mean comparison with associated one-sided t-tests. The columns
on the left compare characteristics for patentees with non-patenting firms, highlighting the correlation
between patenting and innovation effort (R&D expenditure). While export intensity is qualitatively
similar, non-patenting firms have a higher propensity to be non-exporters or pure exporters — both of
the latter findings ring true with reference to work on productivity and exporting (Melitz and Trefler,
2012; Defever and Riano, 2013). Patenting firms are larger, older and have higher liquidity than non-
16In the case of SIPO patents claims must be retrieved from the original patent documents which are only available in
Chinese.
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patenting firms, while state incentives to patent are higher in provinces where patenting firms are located.
These results echo the findings of Guariglia and Liu (2014) who use new product sales as an indicator
of innovation. Our simple analysis of means also finds significant differences between firms patenting
(a) with the USPTO or (b) (only) with SIPO (in the columns on the right of the table): among the
characteristics which distinguish USPTO patentees from those firms which patent only domestically,
the higher R&D expenditure, export-to-sales ratio, and firm size are particularly noteworthy. A number
of characteristics are also surprisingly unimportant in this comparison, notably the financial variables
(except for cash flow) and the provincial-level subsidies for patent applications.
5 Results
5.1 Patenting decision
We begin our discussion with the empirical results for the (binary) patenting decision. Table 4 reports
results for the 4-year sample for which R&D expenditure is observed.17 In all cases the data for the
ASIE sample (ASIE-Qin/Oriana match and ASIE-only firms) are used and near the top of each table
panel we indicate whether we account for selection into the integrated ASIE-Qin/Oriana sample.
Columns [1] and [2] represent simple probit models for the patenting decision with SIPO or USPTO,
while in column [3] we add a sample selection equation for ASIE-Qin/Oriana firms which is estimated
jointly with the two patenting decision equations (results for bivariate probit estimating selection and
SIPO or USPTO patenting jointly yield qualitatively very similar results and are available on request).
The trivariate probit results suggest that our matched-sample regression does not suffer significant selec-
tion bias and that estimating patenting equations for SIPO and USPTO separately only affects estimation
and inference at the margin. The remaining columns then attempt to counter concerns over endogeneity
by instrumenting with the first lag and first and second lags in columns [4]-[6] (in column [6] we addi-
tionally instrument R&D expenditure using first lags). In the absence of obvious external instruments,
these specifications provide some indication of the robustness of our main findings in column [3] to en-
dogeneity concerns. Note however that diagnostic tests yield diverging results in the SIPO and USPTO
models which suggest that for the SIPO equation our instrumentation strategy violates the exclusion
restriction and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
17Appendix Table F-1 shows the linear probability results.
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Conditioning on pure and non-exporters, our various SIPO models suggest a significant negative rela-
tionship between export intensity and patenting behaviour, which is in stark contrast to the findings in
the existing literature. There is further a significant positive relationship with government incentives to
file patents and the decision to apply for a SIPO patent. These models further provide evidence for a sig-
nificant positive effect of innovation effort on the patenting decision, while firm size, foreign or private
ownership, and financial constraints are also significant and have the expected signs.18 On the whole the
SIPO results indicate that the patenting decision is (partly) driven by government incentives, support-
ing the findings of Li (2012), Dang and Motohashi (2015) and Lei et al. (2015), and further that more
export-intensive firms, contrary to a Melitz-type prediction of the exporting-productivity relationship,
have a lower propensity to patent than their peers exporting lower shares of their output.
Turning to the USPTO models many of our results are statistically insignificant, likely due to the limited
number of patentees. Nevertheless we find a significant and strong relationship between the patent-
ing decision and innovation effort, firms size, some measures of financial constraints as well as export
intensity, respectively. The coefficients on government incentives are uniformly low and statistically
insignificant. Coefficients on export intensity are positive and large but not uniformly statistically sig-
nificant across all models.
We further highlight those covariates for which there is a statistically significant difference for coeffi-
cients between the SIPO and USPTO equations: most strikingly, the export-innovation nexus is positive
(though not necessarily statistically significant) and thus in line with the literature for USPTO equations,
while filing subsidies are now even negative (in our IV models), albeit statistically insignificant. Re-
sults for indicators of financial constraints show similar deviation between SIPO and USPTO patentees,
though only in the IV specification with the smallest sample size (column [5]), which is also the specifi-
cation where results for patent subsidies deviate statistically significantly. We obtain qualitatively similar
results when including a set of 2-digit SIC industry dummies to confirm that despite the dominance of
the ITC sector our results are not driven by sector of operation.19
What are the quantitative implications of the differences detected between SIPO and USPTO patentees?
18The coefficient on the cash-flow variable deviates from the existing literature on China (e.g. Guariglia and Liu, 2014) in
that firms do not appear credit-constrained. Our analysis investigates patents (for SIPO: 0.39% of observations are non-zero) as
opposed to (self-reported) new product sales (10.26% of observations are non-zero) in these authors’ work. Hence, differences
in results may be due to that fact that patented inventions commonly represent only a subset of firms’ product innovations
where financial constraints are potentially less relevant.
19We prefer the results without industry fixed effects since inclusion of sectoral dummies reduces the sample size in the
USPTO regression by around 25%: there are no USPTO patent filings in six sectors (Leather and fur; Furniture; Paper;
Printing; Rubber and Transport Equipment) which implies that there is no variation in the dependent variable for observations
in these sectors and they are thus automatically dropped from the sample. There is further non-convergence in the trivariate
probit model if we introduce industry dummies. Full results are available on request.
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Table 5 shows the marginal effects for the coefficients shown in Table 4. For the continuous variables
we focus on a hypothetical shift of a firm from the 75th to the 85th percentile of the distribution, which
in the case of export intensities equates to values of 12% and 76%, respectively. The marginal effects
for export intensity in the SIPO equations range between -0.1% in the probit and -0.3% in the IV probit
specifications, while they are between 0.01% and 0.07% in the USPTO equations: these figures are
modest in absolute terms, although we highlight the generally low propensities to patent at the top of
the table. In addition, as we indicate in the columns marked ‘Ratio’, the export-intensity ‘effect’ is
a multiple of the marginal effects of other firm characteristics such as firm age and size or financial
constraints (note that only results for the continuous variables are directly comparable).
5.2 Patent count analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis of patent production, which we investigate using count regression
models. We present results from three different models with distinct setup and interpretation: first, we
analyse a Negative Binomial for counts of patent applications with SIPO and the USPTO in columns
[1] and [2] of Table 6, respectively. These were found to be favoured over standard Poisson regres-
sions based on a direct statistical comparison (LR test). These estimates provide insights into whether
firm characteristics are associated with differential numbers of patent applications between the two ju-
risdictions. Second, we analyse fixed effects Poisson models in columns [3] and [4], which limit the
sample to ‘innovating’ firms with at least one SIPO or USPTO patent application over the 4-year time
horizon. The interpretation of these models is whether any changes in R&D, export behaviour, financial
variables, etc. within patenting firms over time are associated with higher or lower patent counts; since
many unobserved determinants of patenting are plausibly captured by the firm fixed effects this gets us
closer to a causal interpretation of the results than the previous count data models — note however that
the average number of observations per firm in these FE Poisson models is merely 3.1, thus offering
precious little time series variation to identify precisely any within-firm effects. Third, we move from
counts of patent applications to those of granted patents in the analysis in columns [5] and [6]. The
patent filings-to-grant-ratio for a firm can be interpreted as a first indication of the quality of its patent
filings. We find that only around 63% of SIPO filings are eventually granted whereas 83% of USPTO
filings are, which motivates the analysis in columns [5] and [6].
The patent count models in columns [1] and [2] show similar patterns in terms of sign and statistical
significance between SIPO and USPTO patent counts as were detected in the binary choice models
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of the patenting decision. Innovation effort is positively associated with higher patent counts in line
with earlier findings by Hu and Jefferson (2009). Export intensity (not investigated by these authors),
in contrast, indicates a clear divergence between SIPO and USPTO counts, where the export-patenting
nexus is negative (positive) for the former (latter). U.S. patent count is driven by larger and younger
firms in comparison with SIPO patent counts. Firm financial variables have the expected signs but
differences between jurisdictions are not statistically significant. Patenting incentives have a uniformly
positive impact on patent counts (not always statistically significant) — this may be counter-intuitive,
but further investigation reveals that the positive USPTO coefficient is driven by firms patenting in both
jurisdictions.20 Firm ownership dummies indicate that all non-state-owned firm types are more prolific
USPTO patentees, whereas for SIPO this is only the case among Western FIEs, consistent with earlier
findings by Choi et al. (2011) — again the difference across jurisdictions is not statistically significant.
All of these results are virtually identical if we use granted patent counts in columns [5] and [6] instead
of application counts.
The fixed effects results provide some qualitative indications that increases in export intensity have op-
posite effects on SIPO and USPTO patent counts, although these results are very imprecisely estimated.
Similarly the results for filing subsidies, albeit statistically insignificant in either equation, are once again
in line with the previous patterns in favour of SIPO patenting.21
The reported coefficients, ceteris paribus, are differences in the logs of predicted counts for unit in-
creases in the regressors. We also obtained incident rate ratios (IRR), which compute the relative in-
crease or decrease (coefficients in excess of/below 1, respectively) in patent counts in response to a unit
change in the regressor (reported in Table 7) — for size and age this unit change implies a doubling of
the variable due to logarithmic transformation. In the models in columns [1] and [2] the relative IRR
for export intensity yields a twelve-fold difference between SIPO (patent count reduced to 40%) and
USPTO (patent count more than quadruples),22 that for firm size an almost three-fold difference (SIPO
count doubles, USPTO count quintuples). For firm age a log unit increase sees SIPO patent count drop
to 85% of the previous level, and USPTO counts to 55%, a one-and-a-half-fold difference. Similar fig-
20When we limit the SIPO patent analysis to firms which do not have USPTO patents and vice versa the results for the
subsidy variable are as follows: 0.903 [t=4.00] (SIPO equation), -0.307 [t=-0.88] (USPTO equation).
21Note that the interpretation of the firm ownership dummies is very different in these panel FE models: these estimates now
indicate the impact of a change in ownership, and with the results driven by a small number of observations we do not report
these estimates to avoid confusion.
22A ‘unit increase’ for a variable defined as a ratio between 0 and 1 is clearly difficult to interpret. For convenient inter-
pretation we re-estimated this model using the logarithm of export intensity instead of the level, where a unit increase implies
a doubling of the ratio. The IRR for SIPO applications is then 0.95, that for USPTO 1.64, with a (statistically significant)
1.7-fold difference between the two. The IRRs for size and age are virtually unchanged.
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ures are obtained if we carry out this exercise for the models using granted patents in columns [5] and
[6].23
6 Conclusion
What is behind the recent Chinese patent explosion? Is China transitioning rapidly from imitating tech-
nology to producing genuine innovation? What impact does the patent explosion have on the Chinese
economy and on the rest of the world? While answers to these questions are of immediate concern to
policy makers in China and beyond, their empirical investigation has to date been severely hampered by
data limitations: there were no data available for Chinese firms that included companies’ actual patent
filings or that could distinguish between invention patents and the less innovative utility and design
patents. We overcome these constraints and construct a dataset that contains domestic invention and
U.S. utility patent filings by 316,000 manufacturing firms registered in China. We employ the data to
chart the developments from 1985-2006 and to investigate the factors associated with the Chinese patent
explosion over 2001-6, accounting for concerns over selection into our regression sample from survey
data representative of large and medium-sized enterprises in China.
Our answer to what lies behind the Chinese patent explosion is unambiguous: a handful of companies
account for the overwhelming share of patents. Does this imply there is evidence for wider technological
take-off among Chinese companies? Our analysis suggests most likely not: patenting is concentrated
in very few industries and even within these is undertaken by very few albeit highly active companies.
What is more, the most patent-active companies both with the USPTO and SIPO operate in the ICT
sector, an industry that has become notorious for its patent battles, technological standards (including
standard-essential patents), and patent pools requiring firms to arm themselves with sufficiently large
patent portfolios.
Our results also point to clear differences in the determinants for the patenting decision as well as patent
counts between SIPO and USPTO patentees. While the latter are positively associated with export
intensity as suggested by the existing literature on export behavior and innovation, we find SIPO filings
to be negatively associated. This suggests that patenting with the Chinese patent office may be to a large
extent driven by factors other than underlying innovative behavior: firms patenting with SIPO are found
to be responding to state incentives in the form of patent subsidies. This underscores the importance of
23All magnitudes quoted are identical, with the exception of export intensity, where the difference is now seven-fold: the
SIPO count reduces to 60%, the USPTO count increases by a factor of 4.5.
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incentives put in place by local governments to promote patenting directly.
From a policy point of view this implies that innovation policy objectives formulated in terms of num-
bers of patents (such as in the recent ‘12th Five-Year-Plan’) may not have the desired outcome: merely
promoting the filing of patents that do not protect innovative technologies may create a number of unin-
tentional adverse consequences. For instance, patent thickets — shown to exist in ICT (von Graevenitz
et al., 2013) — are likely to emerge, increasing transaction costs for companies and potentially raising
barriers to entry (Hall et al., 2015). Such patenting behaviour may furthermore lead to an escalation
of patent litigation similar to the explosion of patent actions witnessed in the U.S. over the past decade
(PWC, 2014).
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available online at the OUP website.
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TABLES
Table 1: Top 10 Chinese companies filing with USPTO (1985-2006)
Rank Company Patents Share Main Industry affiliation\
1 Hongfujin Precision Industry (Foxconn) 513 21.75 Electronic computer (404)
2 Huawei Technology 399 16.92 Communications equipment (401)
3 Fuzhun Precision Industry (Foxconn) 214 9.07 Electronic computer (404)
4 China Petroleum Chemical (Sinopec) 156 6.61 Petroleum, Natural Gas Exploration (079)
5 Semiconductor Manufacturing Int. 127 5.38 Electronic apparatus (405)
6 Futaihong Precision Industry (Foxconn) 100 4.24 Communications equipment (401)
7 ZTE 61 2.58 Communications equipment (401)
8 Innocom Technology (Shenzhen) 39 1.65 Communications equipment (401)
9 Lenovo 38 1.61 Electronic computer (404)
9 Nuctech 38 1.61 Special equipment (369)
10 BYD 33 1.39 Automobiles (372)
Other 640 27.14
Total 2,358 100.0
Notes: \ Chinese GB/T 3-digit industry code in brackets.
Table 2: Top 10 Chinese companies filing with SIPO (1985-2006)
Rank Company Patents Share Main Industry affiliation\
1 Huawei Technology 15,588 23.35 Communications equipment (401)
2 ZTE 4,578 6.86 Communications equipment (401)
3 LG Electronics Appliances Tianjin 4,244 6.36 Household electrical apparatus (395)
4 Hongfujin Precision Industry (Foxconn) 3,708 5.56 Electronic computer (404)
5 China Petroleum Chemical (Sinopec) 1,977 2.95 Petroleum, Natural Gas Exploration (079)
6 AU Optronics 1,362 2.04 Electronic computer (404)
7 Lenovo 1,137 1.70 Electronic computer (404)
8 BYD 835 1.12 Automobiles (372)
9 LG Electronics Shanghai 775 1.16 CCO (409)
10 Baoshan Iron & Steel 756 1.13 Ferrous metal smeltering and rolling (320)
Other 31,781 47.77
Total 66,741 100.00
Notes: \ Chinese GB/T 3-digit industry code in brackets. CCO – Communications, computers & other electronic equipment
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Table 3: Descriptive Analysis of Patenting Behaviour
[1] [2]
Patents Patents
None Any Diff t-stat p SIPO USPTO Diff t-stat p
Innovation effort
ln(R&D pw) -0.037 0.218 -0.256 -44.64 0.000 0.212 0.306 -0.094 -2.13 0.017
[0.001] [0.011] [0.006] -22.56 0.000 [0.012] [0.044] [0.044] -2.06 0.020
Export behaviour
Exports/Sales 0.178 0.171 0.007 1.68 0.046 0.157 0.349 -0.192 -14.02 0.000
[0.000] [0.004] [0.004] 1.92 0.027 [0.003] [0.018] [0.014] -10.40 0.000
>90% Export/Sales 0.117 0.070 0.047 12.59 0.000 0.059 0.214 -0.154 -13.39 0.000
[0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 15.81 0.000 [0.003] [0.018] [0.011] -8.43 0.000
Zero Exports 0.724 0.536 0.188 35.86 0.000 0.546 0.406 0.140 6.16 0.000
[0.001] [0.006] [0.005] 32.22 0.000 [0.006] [0.022] [0.023] 6.23 0.000
Size and age
ln(Workers) 4.726 5.748 -1.022 -79.99 0.000 5.701 6.374 -0.673 -11.33 0.000
[0.001] [0.015] [0.013] -66.68 0.000 [0.016] [0.058] [0.059] -11.19 0.000
ln(Firm age) 2.093 2.401 -0.307 -29.98 0.000 2.401 2.396 0.005 0.13 0.449
[0.001] [0.010] [0.010] -29.90 0.000 [0.011] [0.043] [0.040] 0.11 0.454
Financial constraints
Liquidity 0.059 0.092 -0.033 -8.88 0.000 0.091 0.095 -0.003 -0.28 0.391
[0.000] [0.003] [0.004] -10.29 0.000 [0.003] [0.012] [0.012] -0.27 0.395
Leverage 0.583 0.557 0.027 7.79 0.000 0.557 0.553 0.004 0.40 0.343
[0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 9.51 0.000 [0.003] [0.010] [0.010] 0.41 0.340
Cash flow 0.105 0.099 0.006 2.90 0.002 0.098 0.108 -0.010 -1.77 0.038
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002] 3.99 0.000 [0.001] [0.007] [0.006] -1.47 0.071
Patent subsidies
Filing 0.511 0.586 -0.075 -15.45 0.000 0.586 0.589 -0.002 -0.13 0.449
[0.000] [0.005] [0.005] -15.40 0.000 [0.005] [0.018] [0.019] -0.13 0.448
Obs 797,400 7,366 6,851 515
Firms 371,745 2,512 2,334 178
Notes: We carry out separate two-sample t-tests in order to compare various firm-level and regional characteristics for [1]
non-patenting vs patenting firms, and [2] firms patenting with SIPO vs those patenting with USPTO. The p-value indicates
the probability value for a one-sided test. We test each relationship assuming equal or unequal variances across samples
(though the means reported are for the former only), hence we obtain two sets of t-statistics and corresponding p values: the
test statistics in the first (second) row for each variable assume equal (unequal) variances. For illustration t-statistics in bold
indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Count Data Models
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NegBin FE Poisson NegBin
Dep. Variable SIPO USPTO SIPO USPTO SIPO USPTO
Patent Applications × × × ×
Granted Patents × ×
Innovation effort
ln(R&D pw) 1.122 1.049 0.127 0.079 1.214 1.079
[0.176]∗∗∗ [0.139]∗∗∗ [0.056]∗∗ [0.104] [0.189]∗∗∗ [0.146]∗∗∗
ln(R&D pw)2 0.336 0.295 0.057 -0.083 0.393 0.376
[0.094]∗∗∗ [0.118]∗∗ [0.029]∗∗ [0.112] [0.101]∗∗∗ [0.128]∗∗∗
Export behaviour
Exports/Sales -0.978 1.514 -0.564 0.782 -0.498 1.623
[0.429]∗∗ [0.566]∗∗∗ [0.653] [1.134] [0.378] [0.614]∗∗∗
>90% Export/Sales 0.119 -0.420 0.220 -0.294 0.040 -0.451
[0.296] [0.385] [0.395] [0.725] [0.337] [0.402]
Zero Exports -0.103 0.582 -0.300 -0.854 0.277 0.624
[0.334] [0.435] [0.134]∗∗ [0.357]∗∗ [0.238] [0.480]
Firm size and age
ln(Workers) 0.643 1.699 0.214 0.180 0.667 1.715
[0.086]∗∗∗ [0.145]∗∗∗ [0.109]∗∗ [0.508] [0.095]∗∗∗ [0.156]∗∗∗
ln(Firm age) -0.162 -0.566 -0.035 0.771 -0.143 -0.553
[0.094]∗ [0.119]∗∗∗ [0.096] [0.341]∗∗ [0.100] [0.121]∗∗∗
Financial constraints
Liquidity 0.536 2.447 0.101 -0.258 0.884 2.739
[0.432] [0.690]∗∗∗ [0.202] [0.756] [0.459]∗∗ [0.722]∗∗∗
Leverage 0.742 2.364 -0.146 0.111 0.999 2.720
[0.443]∗ [0.622]∗∗∗ [0.358] [0.745] [0.497]∗∗ [0.683]∗∗∗
Cash flow -1.181 -0.619 0.223 0.139 -1.407 -0.845
[0.541]∗∗ [0.842] [0.299] [0.745] [0.539]∗∗∗ [0.961]
Patenting incentives
Filing subsidy 1.003 0.884 0.863 0.239 0.887 0.820
[0.249]∗∗∗ [0.321]∗∗∗ [0.658] [1.023] [0.272]∗∗∗ [0.337]∗∗
Ownership type
FIE (other) 1.201 1.807 1.066 2.037
[0.722]∗ [0.476]∗∗∗ [0.779] [0.500]∗∗∗
FIE (HMT) 0.762 1.378 0.590 1.513
[0.669] [0.434]∗∗∗ [0.701] [0.418]∗∗∗
Private -0.276 0.808 -0.483 1.103
[0.678] [0.341]∗∗ [0.726] [0.335]∗∗∗
Collective -0.626 0.930 -0.822 1.008
[0.746] [0.462]∗∗ [0.813] [0.477]∗∗
Other 0.086 2.319 0.018 2.687
[0.700] [0.618]∗∗∗ [0.760] [0.623]∗∗∗
Further Controls × × × × × ×
Year dummies × × × × × ×
LR (p-value) 0.00 0.00 n/a n/a∑ |yˆi − yi| 0.13 0.02 0.25 0.03
AIC 51,177 4,738 37,908 4,009
LL full model -25,559 -2,339 -7,336 -512 -18,924 -1,974
Observations 804,766 804,766 7,113 507 804,766 804,766
Non-zero obs. 0.39% 0.03% 0.28% 0.03%
Firms 374,257 374,257 2,327 170 374,257 374,257
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the patent count with SIPO or USPTO as indicated. All variables and
‘Further Controls’ are detailed in Table A-4 in the online appendix. IRR reports the incidence rate ratios — see text for details.
Statistically significant coefficients (10% level) and standard errors are printed in bold. In Models [3] and [4] we omit reporting
coefficients for the ownership dummies since these now indicate the patent productivity of firms switching ownership, which
is misleading in the general setup of our analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 7: Count Data Models: Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NegBin FE Poisson NegBin
SIPO USPTO Ratio SIPO USPTO Ratio SIPO USPTO Ratio
IRR
ln(R&D pw) 3.07 2.85 0.9 1.14 1.08 1.0 3.37 2.88 0.9
ln(R&D pw)2 1.40 1.34 1.0 1.06 0.92 0.9 1.48 1.35 0.9
Export/Sales 0.38 4.55 12.1 0.57 2.19 3.8 0.61 4.55 7.5
>90% Export/Sales 1.13 0.66 0.6 1.25 0.75 0.6 1.04 0.66 0.6
Zero Exports 0.90 1.79 2.0 0.74 0.43 0.6 1.32 1.78 1.4
ln(Workers) 1.90 5.47 2.9 1.24 1.20 1.0 1.95 5.46 2.8
ln(Firm age) 0.85 0.57 0.7 0.97 2.17 2.2 0.87 0.57 0.7
Liquidity 1.71 11.55 6.8 1.11 0.77 0.7 2.42 11.54 4.8
Leverage 2.10 10.63 5.1 0.86 1.11 1.3 2.72 10.62 3.9
Cash flow 0.31 0.54 1.8 1.25 1.16 0.9 0.24 0.54 2.2
Filing subsidy 2.73 2.42 0.9 2.37 1.26 0.5 2.43 2.42 1.0
FIE (other) 3.33 6.09 1.8 2.90 6.09 2.1
FIE (HMT) 2.15 3.97 1.8 1.80 3.97 2.2
Private 0.76 2.24 3.0 0.62 2.25 3.6
Collective 0.53 2.53 4.7 0.44 2.54 5.8
Other 1.09 10.17 9.3 1.02 10.16 10.0
Obs 804,766 804,766 7,113 507 804,766 804,766
Firms 374,257 374,257 2,327 170 374,257 374,257
Notes: In this table we report the obtained incident rate ratios (IRRs) for the count data models in Table 6. These represent
the relative increase or decrease (coefficients in excess of/below 1, respectively) in patent counts in response to a unit change
in the regressor — for size and age this unit change implies a doubling of the variable due to logarithmic transformation.
The columns marked ratio report the relative IRR between USPTO and SIPO equations: for instance, export intensity yields
a twelve fold difference in the IRR between USPTO (patent count quadruples) and SIPO (patent count reduced to 30%).
Statistical tests indicate that the IRRs between SIPO and USPTO differ for the export intensity and firm size variables in both
negative binomial models of patent applications and patent grants.
